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Footnotes: 1. At the end of the 1990s, the “Open up the West” socio-economic development campaign started
(Goodman 2004; Cooke 2003). 2. During the course of eleven months, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork
in many nomadic resettlements and I lived for several months in one of these resettlements. 3. Prior to 1950,
the Tibetan world currently under the administration of the PRC was composed of the three regions of Amdo
(a mdo), Ü-tsang (dbus gtsang) and Kham (khams). Nowadays, the Amdo and Kham territories are
incorporated into the PRC’s Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan provinces. 4. On the P.R.C.’s contemporary history
see Béja 2004; Goldstein 1997; Mac Farquhar 1989; Roux 2009; Samarani 2004. 5. Samarani 2004, 307-313.
6. Goodman 2004 and Cooke 2003. 7. In the Amdo area where I conducted fieldwork, Tibetan people
commonly used two words to describe grassland degradation problems. The word brlag is used with the
meaning of “degradation” and “something that is corrupted”. The word btshog which commonly means “dirty”
is also used with the meaning of “polluted/degraded”. According to my interlocutors, the word “pollution” did
not exist until recently. It was introduced from Chinese (wuran) when the P.R.C. authorities started to be
concerned by Tibetan Plateau natural environment protection. 8. For a good summary of Tibetan Plateau
envirnomental studies see Harris 2009. 9. For further consideration on traditional Tibetan conceptions
relating to the environnment see Huber 1991. 10. A medicinal root found only on the Tibetan Plateau the
name of which literally means “summer grass, winter worm”. It is so named because the fungus grows out of
the body of a caterpillar. For further information see Daniel Winkler’s publications, listed at (Accessed 10
October 2010). 11. Herders’ households lived in units composed of a number of tent/households which
moved and camped together. These units, called ru skor in Tibetan (ru means “clan”, but also “bone” and skor
means “circle”), set up circular camps, with the center occupied by the flock. They could be composed of
different families and lineages, but they should be part of the same clan. The ru skor was the smallest unit of
Tibetan herders’ social organization. 12. “Han” is the Chinese name of the biggest population group in the
P.R.C., “Hui” is the Chinese name of Muslim Chinese people. They are both often referred to in western
countries as “Chinese”. 13. There is of course an important question as to the opportunities for nomads on
settlement, but this deserves a study in its own right and will be dealt with in future publications. 14. This
information was collected during fieldwork and is also based on prefectural level government documents. 15.
The Propery Law specified that the land ownership rights are given to land owners for a determined period of
time which vary form 30 to 50 years. Afetr this period, the State can arrogate the right to dispose of lands.
(Propery Law: Article 126). 16. For the analysis of the links between politics and ecology see also Agrawal
2005. 17. Another infamous attempt to sedentarize nomads in the P.R.C.is the Mongolian case (Bulag 2002;
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s, the government of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) began to pay more attention 
to environmental problems and protection of natural 
spaces. Since then, the western regions of the country 
have been involved in ecological policies and plans 
aimed at the protection of these still predominantly 
sparsely populated spaces. Tibetan herders, who 
are exploiting a considerable part of the western 
territories, have been affected by many projects 
that are aimed at both the acceleration of regional 
economic development1 and the protection of the 
Tibetan Plateau’s natural environment.
The grasslands of the Tibetan Plateau are 
interspersed with many small and large lakes and 
thousands of rivers run through it. Moreover, the 
diversity of the flora and fauna of this region is 
unique (Miehe et al 2009; Dan 2002; Deng 2002). 
Making a living in this vast territory, Tibetan herders 
reside in a region that has become one of the focal 
1. At the end of the 1990s, the “Open up the West” socio-
economic development campaign started (Goodman 2004; Cooke 
2003).
points of Chinese government ecological concerns. 
These ones relate to concrete problems associated 
with the “degradation”2 of the Tibetan Plateau’s 
natural environment. Nevertheless, while intending 
to provide a solution for ecological urgencies, the 
Chinese government has adopted several strategies 
that have also led to a shift in the political order, 
bolstering its control over territories and local peoples. 
This paper focuses on the environmental 
discourses promoted by the Chinese government. 
Its ecological policies affect the way people live, 
work and move on the Tibetan Plateau, transforming 
the relationship between people and territory. I 
will compare these official discourses and policies 
and their implementation with the opinions and 
behaviors of Tibetan herders who aim to protect, 
but also to control, the natural spaces in which they 
2. The environmental “degradation” of the grasslands of the 
Tibetan Plateau is a controversial topic since little is really known 
about the causes and the extent of this degradation. Goldstein 
in his report about nomads in mGo log analyzes the “general 
assumptions” made by technical advisors on the state of grasslands, 
and the actual conditions found in the field (Goldstein 1996). 
In this article, I always use the term “degradation” to refer to the 
official technical discourse.      
elisa CenCetti  ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES
tibetan plateau grassland proteCtion: 
tibetan herders’ eCologiCal ConCeptions 
versus state poliCies
The establishment of the vast Three Rivers’ Sources Nature Reserve in 2002 has had a major impact on the 
lives of Tibetan nomadic herders. This paper examines the ecological viewpoints of Tibetan herders, their 
conceptions of grassland protection and what they believe to be the best strategies to solve grazing problems. 
According to the Chinese authorities, the Nature Reserve was established to protect the grasslands, as well as 
the sources of China’s three major rivers—the Yellow River, the Yangtse and the Mekong. Grazing bans and 
flock reduction have been two recurring measures in this ecological protection project. Tibetan herders have 
also often been forced to settle down in new purpose built villages. These “ecological migrations”, as they 
are referred to in State environmental discourse, are also related to State policies to bolster security through 
population surveillance and territorial control. Therefore, in this complex context, ecological strategies 
are combined with political interests. To provide an alternative reading to the existing expert analyses of 
ecological problems and State reports on grassland and grazing problems, my paper focus on what Tibetan 
herders, resettled in new villages, think about these topics. Comparing their views against State discourse 
and policies, it is evident that herders have a different perception of the causes of the current ecological 
problems and propose alternative solutions, showing a high degree of consciousness of and active concern 
over grassland problems. Finally, I argue that the new resettlement villages are the latest step in a much 
longer process of sedentarization, which started in the 1980s with the grasslands’ fencing policy.
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herders point to similar environmental problems, but they 
identify different causes. Furthermore, the strategies to repair 
and protect the environment that are supported by Tibetan 
herders are opposed to those implemented by the Chinese 
government. The PRC authorities and ecologists often neglect 
and trivialize indigenous expertise. However, Tibetan herders 
own local practical knowledge concerning their surrounding 
environment. This knowledge is generated in everyday life 
and preserved by transmission from one generation to the 
next. The people living in an environment as hostile as the 
Tibetan Plateau, which has always confronted its populations 
with enormous difficulties, have to look for solutions allowing 
them to survive, and thus to preserve the environment from 
which they secure their livelihoods.                              
The last part of the paper will focus on one of the 
consequences of the environmental protection projects—the 
“ecological migrations” (Tibetan: skye khams rkyen gyi yul 
mi gans spo ba, Chinese: shengtai yimin) (Yeh 2003; Cooke 
2006) and the resettlement of Tibetan herders. Although these 
policies officially have “green” objectives, they can also be 
deemed as the latest stage of a plan for sedentarizing herders, 
which started in the early 1980s with de-communization 
and the grassland fencing policy. The resettlement of Tibetan 
herders thus bolsters the power of the Chinese government 
over the territories of this region.        
THE THREE RIVERS’ SOURCES NATURE RESERVE
In May 2000, the State Forestry Administration and 
Qinghai Provincial Government set up the Three Rivers’ 
Sources Nature Reserve (Foggin 2005). This environmental 
protection project is concerned with the sources of the three 
most important Chinese rivers—the Yellow River, the Yangtze 
and the Mekong—located on part of the Tibetan Plateau 
that falls under the administration of Qinghai province.  The 
establishment of the nature reserve is the result of a series of 
nested laws and economic projects aimed at environmental 
protection and economic development, as well as territorial 
control. 
The nature reserve, instituted at national level in 2003, 
covers 152,300 km2 of Chinese territory (Foggin 2005). The 
majority of the region’s inhabitants, making up a population 
of roughly 200,000 people, are Tibetan herders. Most of them 
were, until recently, practicing nomadic husbandry and trade. 
The Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures of Yushu, Guoluo and 
Hainan, and the Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture of Haixi 
are all affected by the establishment of the nature reserve 
and implementation of subsequent environmental protection 
measures.
This nature reserve is composed of 18 protected zones 
located in the “Three Rivers Sources” region, which cover 
a total area of about 320,000 km2. This is roughly half of 
Qinghai’s land area. Each zone is divided into three categories: 
water protection (eight zones), fauna protection (three zones) 
and flora protection (seven zones) (Foggin 2005: 6-8).
In order to preserve this territory from potentially 
live. The herders’ perspectives were gathered in 2009 during 
ethnographic fieldwork3 in the Chinese province of Qinghai, 
which includes parts of the Tibetan regions of Amdo and 
Kham.4
Since the Three Rivers’ Sources Nature Reserve (Tibetan: 
gTsang gsum mgo khungs; Chinese: San jiang yuan) was 
established in Qinghai province in 2000, the life-style of 
Tibetan herders has changed radically. They have been 
confronted with the challenges of many transformations, 
including their system of production—husbandry in 
particular—and their place of residence.
Tibetan herders do consider that the grasslands located in 
the Nature Reserve display signs of environmental problems. 
However, an analysis of what Tibetan herders judge as 
environmental “degradation” 5, its causes and the most suitable 
methods to avoid it, shows a conception of environmental 
protection that is very different from that of the State’s.      
Why is there such divergence in State and herders’ 
perceptions? This paper examines the political nature of 
environmental discourse by looking at the way in which it is 
modified by the actors mobilizing it. The arguments used on 
both sides for or against particular ecological strategies reflect 
the herders’ traditions and the axiom of scientific expertise. 
Therefore, these arguments need to be contextualized in order 
to reveal their political nature.
In the first part of the paper, I will introduce the Three Rivers’ 
Sources Nature Reserve and the ecological and development 
plans associated with it, mainly aimed at territorial control 
and preservation of water resources. Secondly, I will analyze 
the Chinese government’s ecological discourse, which is 
legitimated by scientific studies of environmental problems 
on the Tibetan Plateau (Banks et al 2003; Dan 2002; Han et al 
2008; Ho 2000; Ma 2001; Ma 2001; Mihe et al 2009; Wang 
2002). I will then compare these notions with the narratives 
of Tibetan herders, who focus on maintaining pastoral activity 
on the Tibetan Plateau and support communal control of the 
grasslands by Tibetan clans. Both the State and the Tibetan 
3. During the course of eleven months, I conducted ethnographic 
fieldwork in Qinghai province’s Tibetan Autonomous Districts of Dari, 
Maqin, Xinghai and Tongde. I visited many resettlements for Tibetan 
herders and I lived in one of these resettlements for several months. The 
data and information collected during this period are based principally on 
discussions with Tibetan herders who have already been settled down in 
the resettlements. I also interviewed several Tibetan officials as well as some 
Tibetan herders still living on the grasslands.   
4. The Tibetan regions can be divided into three cultural units: Amdo 
(a mdo), Ü-tsang (dbus gtsang) and Kham (khams). Nowadays, Amdo’s 
territories are split between the PRC provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and 
Sichuan. Kham’s territories are located in Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), 
Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces (Gruschke 2001; Tuttle, accessed on 
internet in March 2011).
5. In the Amdo area where I conducted fieldwork, Tibetan people 
commonly used two words to describe grassland environmental problems. 
The word brlag is used with the meaning of “degradation” and “something 
which is corrupted”. The Tibetan herders also use the word btshog, which 
commonly means “dirty”, with the meaning of “polluted/degraded”. According 
to my interlocutors, the word “pollution” did not exist until recently. It was 
introduced from the Chinese (wuran) when the PRC’s authorities started to 
worry about environmental protection on the Tibetan Plateau.    
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damaging human actions, the nature reserve administration 
employs different environmental protection strategies 
according to the assessed needs of each ecological zone (e.g. 
protection of water, wetland, grassland, forest and wildlife). 
These include restricting human access to and use of the 
land to varying degrees. Three types of sectors have been 
thus created within the zones. In the first type, which in total 
covers 31,200 km2 of the reserve, all inhabitants have to be 
relocated, husbandry is forbidden and the flora and fauna 
are protected. This sector is called “no man’s land” (Tibetan: 
mya ngam thang, Chinese: wurenqu) and all human activity 
is banned. In the second sector (39,200 km2), husbandry is 
limited or grazing is only permitted on a seasonal rotational 
basis. Inhabitants are only required to relocate in seriously 
degraded areas. The third sector (81,900 km2) is defined as 
“experimental”. This means that the grasslands have not been 
completely closed to human activity and the government 
encourages the development of ecotourism and ecological 
factories. However, if areas in the third sector show serious 
environmental problems, inhabitants can also be relocated 
and husbandry forbidden.
Despite these official classifications, people living in every 
sector of the nature reserve can actually be resettled at any 
moment on economic, as well as ecological, pretexts. Chinese 
authorities, for example, can decide to relocate people from 
places where husbandry has not been forbidden for ecological 
reasons, instead leaning on a rationale that links settlement to 
the improvement of living conditions (Foggin 2005).     
Since the reform and opening up period of the 1980s, 
Chinese society has experienced profound socio-economic 
changes. During the 1980s, new laws restructured the 
PRC politico-economic apparatus. The introduction of the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS) in 1981 led to the 
disbanding of the people’s communes (Samarani 2004: 307-
313). In Qinghai province, that meant the redistribution 
of livestock to the household, followed by the division and 
distribution of land (Goldstein 1996; Pirie 2005; Yeh 2003). 
This brought important social changes, especially at the level 
of the production system. Moreover, the allocation of land to 
the households also led to a new territorial reconfiguration 
and a new relationship between herders and territory (Pirie 
2005; Yeh 2003).   
During the 1980s, the Chinese government took 
steps to strengthen the management and protection of the 
environment through the Rangeland Law (Chinese: Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo caoyuan fa) (1985) and the Forestry Law 
(Chinese: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo senlin fa) (1984). Two 
other projects followed these laws: the “Open up the West” 
Campaign (Goodman 2004; Cooke 2003) in 2000 and the 
Property Law (Chinese: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wuquan 
fa) (2007). The reorganizations of social space caused by the 
introduction of the market economy and the HRS, and the 
new laws which were aimed at the managing of natural spaces 
contributed to the conception of the Three Rivers’ Sources 
Nature Reserve project.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DISCOURSES AND 
STRATEGIES: OVERLAP OF POLITICS AND ECOLOGY
The establishment of the nature reserve is characterized 
by the correlation of ecological strategies and projects 
with power and territorial control over a vast and sparsely 
populated region in which the authority of the Chinese 
government sometimes seems rather weak. This is evident 
when scientific studies (Dan 2002; Han et al 2008; Ma 2001; 
Ma 2001; Wang 2002) are compared with Tibetan herders’ 
narratives concerning the natural environment in which they 
live.  
The large body of literature analyzing the causes of 
grassland “degradation” and recommending ways to protect 
the rangeland indisputably shows the concern of the Chinese 
government, as well as the scientific world, over the natural 
environment of the Tibetan Plateau. Nevertheless, diversity in 
the findings of these investigations also reveals their political 
intent.
The Chinese government, many ecologists and Tibetan 
herders express quite similar observations about the 
environment of the Tibetan Plateau. However, what they 
perceive “to be in a degraded condition” and what they 
mean when they use terms such as “degradation” varies 
considerably from one actor to another. Who exactly 
employs a certain kind of environmental discourse? In what 
context and focusing on which objectives? The adoption of 
environmental protection strategies does not only mean that 
action is taken in a “neutral” natural area. It also signifies an 
intervention in a “milieu” of complex relationships between 
people and between people and territory. The Three River’s 
Sources Nature Reserve project can be conceptualized as a 
Foucauldian milieu (Foucault 2004: 3-29), where nature, 
power, and social elements are circulating and interacting. 
Focusing on the understanding of the issues linked to the 
interconnection of these different elements, which constitutes 
the complexity of ecological policies, I will analyze them 
taking into account their interactional “milieu”.
What does “degradation” mean?
Recent studies on the environment of the Tibetan Plateau 
show that there have been significant changes to soil, water, 
flora and fauna levels over the past 50 years.6 According to 
these studies, grassland degradation became problematic in 
the 1960s.7 Subsequently degraded natural spaces grew by 
15 percent every decade (Han et al 2008: 233). This rate has 
increased during the last ten years, in the case of Qinghai 
from 17 percent in 1990 to 39 percent in 1999 (Han et al 
2008: 235).
The grasslands of the Tibetan Plateau are experiencing 
increasingly rapid desertification. According to environmental 
6. For a good summary of studies on the environment of the Tibetan 
Plateau see Harris (2009).
7. Goldstein, mitigating the analysis of the experts, argues that these 
changes will not necessarily result in the collapse of the Tibetan Plateau 
ecosystem (Goldstein 1996).
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serious problems concerning grass growth and confirmed that 
the quality of rangeland grass is worsening: weeds grow faster 
than in the past and take over space needed for grass to feed 
the flock. Moreover, grass quantity is now more frequently 
insufficient to satisfy flock needs8. Another problem often 
outlined by the herders is that the grass is growing more 
slowly than in the past. 
In general, herders’ perceptions of pollution are quite 
fuzzy and the parameters used for their evaluations vary 
considerably. This could well be linked to the confusing 
messages conveyed by government actions, such as the 
opening of mines and waste-dumping sites in “protected” 
areas. The herders are told that their flock is damaging the 
grassland and are taught to not use plastic bags because they 
pollute. Yet they are experiencing problems caused by mining 
and waste-dumping in the “protected” grasslands.
Moreover, Tibetan herders relate soil pollution to their 
religious beliefs9: an area becomes polluted once people start 
to dig and “bother” the soil because of the soil’s lha (deities) 
(Stein 1986: 174-183; Tucci 1976: 205-260). This explains 
why the herders perceive the grassland, where they rear flock, 
as generally unpolluted, with the exception of some specific 
valleys where, in recent years, the Chinese government has 
opened mines or used the land to dump waste. Herders 
were conscious of the fact that, as experts have pointed out, 
important changes are happening in the region’s ecosystem. 
On the other hand, their pragmatic way of looking at the 
problems has enabled them to find alternative explanations 
for the ongoing degradation, and to offer completely different 
strategies of intervention. 
The causes of degradation
Studies of the Tibetan Plateau’s environmental problems 
also link grassland “degradation” to multiple factors, which 
include global ecological problems such as climate change. 
Nevertheless, the grassland “degradation” is mostly imputed 
to exclusively local factors, such as the “culture” of Tibetan 
herders (Wang 2002; Tu et al 2008).
Within the scientific literature, the most widely accepted 
cause of degradation is overgrazing, which is traced back to 
the 1950s, but has increased since the 1990s. While at the 
beginning of the 1990s Qinghai’s grassland was not judged 
to be overexploited at all, by the end of the decade, 31 
percent of the province’s grassland was assessed as overgrazed 
(Han et al 2008: 235). The increasing exploitation rates are 
thought to be due to the fact that husbandry was not carried 
out according to “scientific criteria” (which are not further 
clarified in these studies) and livestock was held in a way 
which caused overcrowding and consequent exhaustion of 
rangeland.
These studies also link degradation and overgrazing to 
8. A lack of grass for feeding the livestock is also linked to others 
factors: i.e. grassland fencing and the obligation to stay all year in the same 
pastures. See also Pire (2005) and Yeh (2003). 
9. On Tibetans beliefs about the natural environment see Huber (1991). 
experts, this process is contributed to by increasing sand 
storms. The rangelands are affected by soil erosion and an 
impoverishment of the soil because of a lack of chemical 
elements, such as carbon and nitrogen. The reduction of 
certain chemical elements in the local soil is also contributing 
to soil exhaustion (Han et al 2008: 234; Wang 2002; Dan 
2002). These changes have been linked to the reduction of 
humid zones, such as glacier surfaces, rivers and lakes (Han et 
al 2008: 234; Wang 2002; Dan 2002). Moreover, soil erosion, 
caused by deforestation, resulted in a rise of debris in the 
inferior basins of the Nature Reserve’s rivers. This eventually 
led to a series of floods in the eastern regions of the PRC in 
the 1990s (Yeh 2006).         
The productivity and diversity of vegetation on the Tibetan 
Plateau are decreasing (Han et al 2008). The extinction and 
overall reduction of flora is often used as a general measure 
of grassland degradation: the productivity of rangeland grass 
is only 50 percent of 1950s grass productivity (Han et al 
2008: 234). Furthermore, the number of animal species on 
the Tibetan Plateau has significantly decreased over recent 
decades because of hunting and the transformation of flora. 
At the same time grasshopper and rodent infestations have 
considerably increased (Dan 2002).  
Tibetan herders are aware of the changes to the grassland of 
the Tibetan Plateau over the past fifty years, but do not use the 
term “degraded” to discuss them. They possess an empirical 
and detailed knowledge concerning the environment in which 
they live, linked to their personal experiences. This practical 
knowledge is derived from working, living and exploiting 
the resources of the grasslands. It has contributed to the 
configuration of an approach to dealing with environmental 
problems that differs from that of environmental experts and 
the Chinese government. 
This way of analyzing environmental problems, based on 
concrete observations, has not been taken into account by 
official and scientific discourses. On the contrary, they often 
discount the knowledge of Tibetan herders as “backward” 
and “not scientific”, thus not worth further consideration. 
Knowledge can be arrived at either theoretically or empirically. 
These two different approaches have arrived at a common 
conclusion: there are environmental problems. However, the 
conclusions they reach about what should be done about this 
are completely different (husbandry reduction and nature 
reserve vs. previous forms of husbandry practices).  
When herders evaluated the grassland situation, they 
always pointed to specific problems closely linked to their 
work as herders and rarely used the word “degraded”. They 
emphasized that the grasslands were not more “degraded” 
than in the past, but they noticed that over the last decades 
environmental changes had occurred. When they discussed 
ecological policies and the Three Rivers’ Sources Nature 
Reserve project, they confirmed the official discourse 
concerning environmental problems. However, they 
immediately focused on specific issues, rather than making 
generalizations. They argued that the grassland suffers from 
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population growth in grassland areas and a growing demand 
for meat in the PRC’s eastern provinces. Both would lead to 
larger flocks grazing the same amount of grassland. They do 
not mention the problems caused by grazing on different 
sized allotments over different time intervals. As a result of 
the fencing policy and sedentarization, the herders graze 
flock in reduced sized allotments for longer periods (Pirie 
2005; Yeh 2003). Moreover, during the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), demand for new plots led to an intensification 
of land clearance and (often failed) attempts to cultivate the 
grasslands (Banks 2003; Ho 2000). Forestry zones have 
also been exhausted in the drive to develop and promote 
the economy of these remote areas. Clearance and resource 
exploitation—tree cutting, mining and intensive exploitation 
of grassland—accelerated desertification and soil erosion 
(Han et al 2008).
Grassland degradation has also been considered to result 
from the harvest of medicinal plants (Wang 2002; Dan 2002) 
such as caterpillar fungus (see Sułek, this issue). This activity 
damages the fragile soil, which, according to Tibetan herders, 
often does not revitalize, and the medicinal plants and grass 
hardly recover. Nevertheless, the caterpillar fungus trade 
has become very profitable in recent years, with massive 
demand from China’s eastern provinces. The value of this root 
increased by 900 percent from 1997 to 2008 (Winkler 2010). 
This is why, during the harvesting season, a growing number 
of people come to the Tibetan Plateau to dig for this root. 
Generally, scientific studies accuse Tibetan herders 
of being the main party responsible for overgrazing and 
overcrowding because they use grassland in an inefficient way. 
These studies underline that, although modern techniques of 
husbandry exist, Tibetan herders still rely on ancient systems 
based on local beliefs that do not maximize productivity or 
consolidate the quality of their products. They are therefore 
judged “inexperienced” and “backward”.
All the arguments discussed above have been used to 
justify the establishment of the Three Rivers’ Sources Nature 
Reserve and the strategies implemented to protect the Tibetan 
Plateau’s flora and fauna. While the Chinese government 
generally holds Tibetan herders directly responsible for 
grassland degradation, its policies do not only reflect State 
concern with environmental problems. As I will argue in 
the last part of this paper, they also overlap with political 
priorities, such as territorial control, the surveying and use of 
rangeland, and regulation and management of water.
Tibetan herders generally acknowledged that the reasons 
for current environmental problems are similar to those 
mentioned above. Nevertheless, they named different causal 
factors. In their view, degradation is not the result of a lack 
of experience on the part of the herders, but of erroneous 
grassland production policies and inept exploitation 
practices. Despite official and scientific discourses, Tibetan 
herders believe that the environmental problems are rooted 
in a specific and quite recent moment of PRC history: the 
division of the grasslands among herders’ households.
The introduction of the HRS (Household Responsibility 
System) at the beginning of the 1980s was the most important 
transformation in land organization and the PRC’s system of 
production since the establishment of People’s Communes 
during the Maoist period (Bauer 2005; Béja 2004; Goldstein 
1997; Samarani 2004). The communes were progressively 
dismantled and, at the lowest level, territorial divisions were 
substituted by the administrative village and township (Clarke 
1989). In the Amdo region, flock ownership at the level of 
single households was already practiced before 1956, but 
lands were communally, not individually, owned (Goldstein 
1996). The encampment10 constituted the lowest level in the 
division and ownership of land (Clarke 1989).
In the 1980s, the household became the smallest 
production unit to which the Chinese government assigned 
a legal status. The financial and welfare systems were 
restructured according to this economic unit. Released from 
communes and becoming an autonomous production unit, 
the household could buy and sell self-produced products in 
the market. 
As a consequence of this transformation, livestock 
and farming tools previously held by the commune were 
redistributed to households. Moreover, the Qinghai province 
government pushed forwards this process and restructured 
the rangeland’s division, dividing and allocating the grasslands 
to individual households (Goldstein 1996). 
The government allocated grassland plots to Tibetan 
herders who became responsible for land management. 
With the end of the common sharing of the grasslands, the 
government hoped to avoid overexploitation, sometimes 
referred to as the “tragedy of the communes” (Hardin 1968; 
Ho 2000; Banks et al 2003). Single households were given 
responsibility for grassland management and husbandry 
practices. According to this policy, Tibetan herders, as 
managers of the pastures, were responsible for setting up 
economic and productivity strategies and for maintaining the 
fertility and sustainability of their assigned plots. Assigning 
responsibility in this way was supposed to stimulate herders 
to undertake a kind of husbandry that would maximize 
profits while keeping up productivity and preventing soil 
exhaustion.
In Qinghai, the division of the grasslands took place on 
the level of production teams (the present administrative 
villages), which then distributed the land among all 
households following two main principles: the number of 
livestock a household obtained during decollectivization 
and the size of the flock when the pastures were divided 
(Goldstein 1996). After this division and distribution, 
10. Herders lived in encampments composed by several households/
tents, which moved and camped together. These encampments called ru skor 
in Tibetan (ru translates the Mongolian term for “banner” and skor means 
“circle”), were set up in circular camps, with the center occupied by the flock. 
They could be composed of different families, but of the same lineage or tsho 
ba (literally “group”, referring to a kinship and territorially based group). The 
ru skor was the smallest unit of Tibetan herders’ social organization. See also 
Clarke (1989) and Pirie (2005).
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current state of degradation.  
According to the herders, therefore, the degradation of 
pastures should be associated with the grassland fencing 
policies, which forced them to abuse the grassland by letting 
flocks graze uninterruptedly in territories that were too small. 
Before the fencing of the grasslands, problems such as pasture 
overcrowding and overgrazing did not occur. Therefore, 
according to the herders, they are not responsible for current 
degradation problems because they were just obeying Chinese 
government orders. It is not a matter of their inexperience 
or so-called backward husbandry techniques, but of inept 
political choices.
Tibetan herders, like the scientists, believe that the 
harvesting of caterpillar fungus is closely related to the 
degradation of the Tibetan Plateau. However, in their view, 
this is because people coming from other Chinese provinces to 
harvest this root do not know the right harvesting techniques 
and consequently inflict irremediable damage to grassland 
soil.
The herders employ similar reasoning over the issue of 
mineral resource exploitation. They accuse the Chinese 
government of neglecting its responsibility to protect the 
Tibetan Plateau. Chinese authorities have indeed granted 
mining licenses to migrants from other provinces and profited 
from mining activities on the Tibetan Plateau. Tibetan people, 
therefore, often blame the government for tolerating un-
regulated exploitation that leads to the pollution of several 
valleys which belong to the Nature Reserve. In my fieldwork 
areas, the herders also claim in vain the right to gain at least 
part of the profits associated with mineral extraction.
Tibetan herders commonly hold the Chinese State 
responsible for environmental problems, drawing on the same 
kind of reasoning found in the State’s environmental discourse. 
Deregulated use of plateau resources, such as hunting, over-
harvesting of medicinal plants, depletion of forest resources 
and extensive exploitation of mineral resources are problems 
that, herders say, result from the large-scale in-migration of 
Han and Hui (Muslim) people and the absence of official rules 
to protect the plateau’s resources. 
Such mutual accusations regarding the plight of the 
Tibetan Plateau highlight official intervention strategies that 
reaffirm State power. On the other hand, they demonstrate 
that the Tibetan herders have themselves appropriated 
State ecological discourses to legitimate their own political 
claims, for example in the case of caterpillar fungus digging, 
which will be discussed below. An analysis of the strategies 
implemented by the Chinese government and the proposals 
of the Tibetan herders which share the goal of recovering 
the Tibetan Plateau from “degradation”, reveals the politics 
concealed behind environmental discourses.
Strategies of environmental protection or political 
affirmation?
The distance between the positions of the Chinese 
government and the herders concerning environmental 
herders were asked to build fences around their pastures 
and to respect the established boundaries. The official aim 
was to regulate pastoral practices (Pirie 2005). Inside their 
clan’s (Tibetan: sde ba) territory, herders no longer had the 
right to let the flock graze freely:11 livestock had to stay on 
the grasslands distributed to the household. My interlocutors 
claimed that even the flock’s movement between summer and 
winter pastures was sometimes no longer possible.                     
Consequently when the pastures were fenced, two kinds 
of territorial conflict quickly emerged: within clans, at ru skor 
level, and sometimes inside a single family group. When the 
grasslands were divided, disputes between households sprang 
up because the government criteria for dividing pasturelands, 
according to my interlocutors, did not take into account the 
quality and kind of pasture (winter or summer) and soil or 
water resources. Once the division became effective, herders’ 
households, previously part of the same ru skor or of the 
same family, started to fight because the borders separating 
pastures were not well defined.12 In addition, herders did 
not acknowledge official boundaries that did not take into 
account the territory’s previous divisions at the level of tsho 
ba. These had corresponded to production team (Clarke 
1989: 399).13 This was another source of conflict as herders 
claimed property rights over parts of neighboring plots. 
Between townships, at inter-clan level, fights arose concerning 
the juridical admission of clan territory since some of the land 
owned by one clan sometimes fell under the administration of 
a township in which another clan was living.
As a consequence of rangeland division, seasonal 
movements from one pasture to another were no longer 
possible. This means that herders had to graze their 
flocks using the same pasture all year round. Whereas the 
government consistently focuses on overcrowding and 
overgrazing as the main cause of grassland degradation, 
Tibetan herders understand the prohibition of shifting 
between different pastures as the principal factor. They 
believe that this has slowly led, during recent years, to the 
11. According to my interlocutors, before the grasslands were fenced, 
the herders could graze their livestock “wherever they wanted inside their clan 
(sde ba) teritory and sometime even in others clans’ grasslands.” According 
to Pirie (2005: 18), even single households could move quite freely between 
different groups’ territories. Nevertheless, I am persuaded my interlocutors 
made these claims to emphasize the problems caused by actual immobility, 
rather than to assert the absence of coordination inside the clan and between 
the clans (Clarke 1989).   
12. Pirie (2005) criticizing Yeh (2003), argues that conflicts and 
disputes between Tibetan herders and between herders’ clans were not 
caused by rangeland division in Amdo, but had existed since ancient times. I 
agree partially with Pirie’s argument because there were, previously, territorial 
conflicts between Tibetans herders and between the different populations 
sharing this region (Gruschke 2001; Ekvall 1977; Chen 2003). Nevertheless, 
I also think that there are some new dynamics in the recent conflicts 
between herders for control over the grassland, i.e. intra-familial conflicts. 
My interlocutors also stressed this point: according to them, the division of 
the grasslands also created a serious danger of rifts within families. See also 
Clarke (1989: 405).   
13. According to Yeh (2003: 514), the Chinese government did not 
even maintain the tsho ba’s names when it created the administrative districts. 
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problems increase substantially when improvement strategies 
and suggestions concerning the implementation of ecological 
projects are analyzed. Policies for environmental protection 
implemented by the Chinese government and the actions that 
Tibetan herders suggest should be taken to tackle degradation 
are fundamentally opposed. The Chinese government 
promotes projects that push forward the implementation of 
rangeland fencing, while the herders support an oppositional 
strategy calling for a return to former practices that allowed 
the sharing of grassland between encampments (ru skor) 
belonging to the same sde ba.
After the opening of the Three Rivers’ Sources Nature 
Reserve, State environmental protection plans imposed a 
further reduction of flock size and compulsory herding of the 
flock on one pasture for a fixed period. As noted above, in 
some parts of the nature reserve any kind of exploitation has 
been forbidden. Not only is husbandry prohibited, but the 
mere presence of persons is not sanctioned.
Following revisions to the Rangeland Law (2002), fencing 
has been further encouraged. Governmental exhortations to 
adopt a “scientific” form of husbandry are presented as the 
key for safeguarding the grassland from further degradation 
and overgrazing (Yeh 2003: 500). 
In environmental protection strategies, particular emphasis 
has been placed on the so-called “ecological migrations” and 
the resettlement of Tibetan herders, who are relocated close to 
existing settlements or principal roads. Tibetan herders were 
asked, but equally often forced, to abandon their pastures 
and settle down in these special resettlements. The Chinese 
government holds that, by banishing human activity and 
husbandry for periods varying from one decade to perpetuity, 
it intends to revitalize the degraded grassland.
According to Tibetan herders, the official goal of the Chinese 
government cannot be reached using the means described 
above. Given that pastoral degradation commenced with the 
enforcement of rangeland fencing during the 1980s, their 
logic runs, the solution to the Tibetan Plateau’s environmental 
degradation cannot possibly be the further implementation 
of fencing policies that, in extreme cases, lead to grazing 
prohibition. The key solution to environmental problems lies, 
according to the herders, in looking to pre-1950 husbandry 
practices. Settled Tibetan herders claimed that the prohibition 
of animal husbandry is not the right method to revitalize the 
grassland. Rather, they believe that the abolition of territorial 
fencing and the restoration of nomadic husbandry will help 
to repair the natural environment of the Tibetan Plateau. The 
restoration of seasonal migrations, practiced three or four 
times per year using three or four different pastures, should 
provide sufficient time for the grass to recover from grazing.
The restoration of nomadic practices would also allow 
herders to pursue a way of life for which they possess the 
necessary skills and expertise. Practicing husbandry would 
enable them to live self-sufficiently because they would be 
able to produce the majority of products needed for everyday 
consumption. At present, they often depend on government 
subsides, for which they are deemed eligible for a period of 
ten years beginning from the date of settlement. 
Caterpillar fungus harvesting policies: alignment of State 
and herders’ interests
The establishment of the nature reserve and associated 
environmental protection policies mean that the protected 
areas are closed for people coming from other provinces of 
China to harvest caterpillar fungus. This governmental step 
to preclude non-indigenous people from using the plateau’s 
resources aligns with indigenous discourse. The herders 
support certain policies and discourses that enable them to 
pursue their own political objectives related to territorial 
control and management. The prohibition on outsiders 
harvesting caterpillar fungus creates an important distinction 
between indigenous people and outsiders which has 
significant economic but also political consequences.
The profits coming from this business are considerable: 
those involved in it can realize as much profit in the space of 
a few months as the average herder could make after working 
on the pastures for a long time (see Sułek, this issue). The 
interdiction of harvesting by non-indigenous individuals 
means that immigrants have to obtain a license and be 
officially admitted to the region. That means that they have 
to pay taxes. The Chinese government thus controls this 
business through the distribution and withdrawal of licenses 
and gains significant profits.14 Tibetan herders have a kind of 
exclusive harvesting right since they are indigenous people; 
therefore they do not have to compete with immigrants, at 
least in the first step of this business. 
This prohibition seems to restore a certain degree of 
autonomy and control over this part of the Tibetan Plateau’s 
territories to the herders. With the intention of preventing 
outsiders illegally harvesting caterpillar fungus, indigenous 
people are invited by the Chinese authorities to survey their 
grasslands. This role in controlling the comings and goings 
of outsiders on the grasslands and the above-mentioned 
exclusivity of land usufruct have the effect that herders view 
themselves as rightly entitled to these territories. Moreover, 
caterpillar fungus becomes a catalyst for greater social 
cooperation to ensure effective monitoring of widespread 
resources.
On an economic level, one of the consequences is 
corruption. During harvest time, herders receive payments 
from immigrants who bribe them to gain access to restricted 
areas. At the political level, this environmental policy restores 
a certain degree of power to the herders over their ancient 
territories by returning to them the responsibility of managing 
the influx of individuals and allowing them to be in charge of 
the circulation of outsiders on the grasslands.
14. This information was collected during fieldwork and is also based 
on prefectural level government documents.  
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the establishment of the Three Rivers’ Sources Nature Reserve 
certainly provide a dispositive to safeguard the ecological 
well-being of the Tibetan Plateau. However, they also interfere 
with the local political and territorial equilibrium. They affect 
practices of control and surveillance of the indigenous people, 
and they also influence the local system of production. 
In the last section, I will examine the mechanisms of 
territorial control, which derive from the creation of the nature 
reserve’s protected “milieu.” I will conclude by analyzing the 
“ecological migrations” and the resettlement of herders. I will 
also show how these resettlements are, temporally speaking, 
simply the latest in a series of strategies to sedentarize Tibetan 
herders dating back to the 1980s. 
Three Rivers’ Sources Nature Reserve and territorial 
survey
The establishment of the nature reserve began in the wake 
of a period characterized by particularly strong confusion 
over the territorial division and control of the Tibetan Plateau 
as a result of rangeland partition. Territorial conflicts emerged 
from grassland distribution due to the complex and fuzzy 
legislative situation. The legal owner of land, which according 
to the Chinese Constitution is either the State or collective 
(the latter is never precisely defined), allocates its territories 
to households or groups of households, which hold usufruct 
rights. This legislative situation fixed land distributions 
The politico-territorial impact of environmental 
protection plans
Environmental protection plans and strategies, such as 
the nature reserve and the resettlement of indigenous people 
living in it, also have political implications. According to 
Tibetan herders, current environmental problems correlate 
with a specific moment in history: when several erroneous 
political decisions triggered the process of pasture degradation. 
Moreover, they also criticized the lack of adequate regulation 
and the absence of governmental control over the commercial 
flow of extracted items such as medicinal plants and mineral 
resources.15 This simultaneous absence and presence of the 
State in pastoral areas can be analyzed from an environmental 
perspective. Nevertheless, when we talk about the governance 
of a specific natural “milieu,” ecological discourse develops 
in concomitance with and overlapping the powers existing 
in this “milieu.” Environmental protection plans and the 
establishment of nature reserves also reflect political issues. 
Focusing on matters of power, ecological discourses and 
policies have to be contextualized at the local level, where 
they are fabricated and implemented. 
The programs conceived for environmental protection and 
15. The absence of government intervention in regulating problems on 
the Tibetan Plateau is also pointed out in the case of disputes and conflicts 
between herders (Yeh 2003; Pirie 2005).
Yak Herders, Qinghai. Photo: Elisa Cencetti
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effectuated during the 1980s for long periods (Goldstein 
1996: 8-9). Households were able to rent these plots, but they 
still could not sell or buy them (Rangeland Law 1985), since 
they were not the landowners. 
While the nature reserve project added to this already 
complex framework, the Property Law (2007) provided 
for the first time since the dismantling of the communes, a 
legal framework for the distribution and ownership of land. 
Tibetan herders gained ownership rights over pastureland 
and could autonomously sell and buy the land (Property Law: 
Articles 126, 127, 128). This law should help to solve further 
escalation of territorial conflicts through better definition 
of the authorities charged with the settlement of territorial 
disputes. 
However, when Tibetan herders living in the “Three 
Rivers’ Sources” region became grassland owners, they were 
constrained by the establishment of the nature reserve. In 
practice, lands rights often cannot be claimed. By establishing 
a nature reserve, the State affirms its right to protect the 
natural environment of its territories. Therefore, even if a 
herder has pasture rights, these are inferior to the rights of the 
State as the legitimate owner. 
In the Property Law, it is specified that land ownership 
rights16 oblige owners to protect and develop the natural 
potential of the owned lands. If institutions (managed by the 
government) responsible for environmental protection, assess 
that the grasslands are damaged and have to be protected, 
the herders cannot object to these ecological requests and are 
therefore forced to obey the State’s instructions.
Land ownership rights exist inside the judicial frames set 
by the State, which continues to use its power to reclaim its 
lands at any given moment. Through its ecological policies, 
the Chinese government does acknowledge the property 
rights of its citizens, but it maintains sufficient sovereign 
authority over its territories so as not to have to take into 
account indigenous claims. 
Since herders do not possess mastery of the languages 
(Chinese and English) and scientific discourse of the academic 
elite, they are not recognized by the Chinese government as 
holding any generally acknowledged scientific expertise. They 
are therefore marginalized from discourses concerned with 
environmental protection and cannot contribute to debates 
leading to the formulation of ecological policies concerning 
the territories in which they live.
From the practice of fencing rangeland to new 
resettlements: “green sedentarization” policies
The biggest changes that Tibetan herders consider that 
they have had to cope with over the last three decades 
were introduced by rangeland division and the fencing 
policy during the 1980s: the interdiction of seasonal flock 
16. The Property Law specified that the land ownership rights are given 
to land owners for a determined period of time which varies from 30 to 50 
years. After this period, the State can arrogate the right to dispose of lands 
(Propery Law: Article 126).
movements and the restriction of grazing to the assigned 
household’s grassland. 
In the mid-1990s, a new poverty reduction program was 
introduced (Yeh 2005: 15). Called sipeitao in Chinese, it 
awarded subsides to herders who engaged in the construction 
of houses and shelters for flock, fenced their pastures and 
cultivated a portion of their pasture with forage. This program 
reinforced and accelerated the changes experienced by herders 
after land distribution. Nomadic husbandry practices were 
slowly transformed due to the constraints of the sedentary 
husbandry methods introduced by the sipeitao program.
When they were asked about the most important and 
profound changes they had experienced over the last few 
decades, Tibetan herders living in the resettlements said 
that rangeland fencing and immobility were the most radical 
changes in their lives. When they spoke about changes and 
transformations, they never mentioned the relatively recent 
“ecological migrations” and resettlement plans. Instead, they 
brought up the 1980s, when decollectivization and the fencing 
policy were implemented; according to them, new kinds of 
territorial conflicts emerged from these transformations 17. 
The division of the grassland directly obstructed nomadic 
practices of husbandry for the first time. Subsequent 
poverty reduction programs, requiring herders to build 
houses and shelters, marked another important step toward 
sedentarization. Herders did not perceive the “ecological 
migrations” and resettlement, which in the Three Rivers’ 
Sources Nature Reserve have occurred since 2003, as radical 
changes in their life-style. They had to move, sometimes 
ending up in areas far from their previous homes. Some 
herders also had to sell part of or all of their flock. However, 
these changes were not as upsetting to them as the division 
of the grasslands and the fencing policy, which they had been 
confronted with in the 1980s and the 1990s.
Settling down in resettlements as planned by the 
“ecological migrations” program is indisputably a further step 
in the sedentarization process. Nevertheless, it seems wrong 
to consider this politico-ecological plan the catalyst of the 
Tibetan herders’ sedentarization process, as it is often presented 
in Western academic studies and press articles. Rather, the 
“ecological migrations” of Tibetan herders have simply made 
visible, through these new resettlements shooting up on the 
grasslands, this phenomenon of sedentarization, which has 
been slowly developing since at least the 1980s. 
The end of nomadism, which is the most radical change 
in Tibetan herders’ life-styles, stemmed from fencing and 
the limits imposed on seasonal movements. Moreover, 
by the 1980s Tibetan herders were building houses on 
the grasslands with government subsidies. In addition, a 
process of government dependency, especially in terms 
17. I am aware that my interlocutors might not have wanted to discuss 
the recent resettlement plans and therefore pointed instead to the grassland 
divisions of the 1980s. Nevertheless, they always suggested to me that they 
have been settled down for a long time and that the recent resettlement is 
more a change of residence than a “life-style” transformation.
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environmental problems does exist, Tibetan herders’ interests 
and aims do not match those of the Chinese government and 
vice-versa. This difference of objectives generates different 
kinds of ecological discourses and policies. The Chinese 
government, on the pretext of environmental protection, 
is reducing and gathering the inhabitants of the Tibetan 
Plateau, thus allowing better control and surveillance over a 
troublesome national minority. Tibetan herders, on the other 
hand, appropriate State ecological discourse to advocate a turn 
towards previous husbandry practices linked to a nomadic 
life-style. This clashes with the PRC’s political agenda.   
The last part of this paper described the milieus where 
ecology and politics overlap. It showed how ecological 
discourse and environmental protection projects are used as 
tools to impose ecological but also political wills, the latter 
concerned with the control of the territories and peoples of a 
strategically important region, rich in natural resources.
From a Foucauldian perspective, the Three Rivers’ 
Sources Nature Reserve can be viewed as a “milieu” because it 
is located at the point of intersection where power intervenes 
in the tangle between the natural and human worlds. The 
scientific discourse nourishes a political discourse that 
influences the people and the natural environment examined 
by this scientific discourse. 
I use the term “green sedentarization” to refer to this 
tangle between what is related to power and what is linked 
to ecological discourses.18 Sedentarization, in political 
terms, is not something new within the Chinese government 
political agenda19, but the combination of this objective with 
environmental protection discourses is.
The switching from political to ecological frames arises 
from the ambiguity created by the State’s intervention in a 
specific “milieu”. This fixed space is “naturalized” by this 
switching process and, by doing so, its political character 
is masked under ecological frames. This prevents Tibetan 
herders from raising any kind of political claim linked to 
these policies because they are introduced in the apparently 
“apolitical” field of ecology. At the same time, the privileging 
of scientific expertise and discourse and the assumption of 
the backwardness of Tibetan herders in this regard, prevent 
the herders from participating in discussions relating to 
environmental projects on the Tibetan Plateau. 
State action wearing a “green” label minimizes the 
importance of and disguises its political objectives of control 
and surveillance. Analyzing ecological discourses, which are 
frequently employed in current Chinese and international 
debates, we should not forget the nature of governmental 
“green” interventions. Although “green” is a trope often 
mobilized to justify actions to preserve nature both on a 
national and global scale, supposedly “green” plans and 
policies to protect “natural” environments also have far-
18. For an analysis of the links between politics and ecology see also 
Agrawal (2005).  
19. Another infamous attempt to sedentarize nomads in the PRC is the 
Mongolian case (Bulag 2002; Even 2006; Seneath 2000).
of medical and education services, has been driven by the 
creation of township and county headquarters accompanied 
by infrastructural development. All of these factors have 
influenced the trend toward sedentarization. 
The political implications of the “ecological migrations” 
project are linked with territorial issues of land and water 
control as well as population surveillance. These issues led 
to the original policies to divide and fence the grasslands 
and, more recently, to establish the nature reserve project and 
impose restrictions on grassland exploitation. The “ecological 
migrations” program provides the Chinese government with 
a new tool to assert its sovereignty over regions with large 
national minority populations. The politic of this program is 
concealed under the discourses of environmental protection, 
which are presented as purely “scientific,” thus justifying the 
program’s implementation.
Yet, the resettlements are indeed a way to bolster the State’s 
power over people spread across a vast area that is difficult to 
control. Surveillance of and control over people are facilitated 
by gathering and settling them in defined places (Scott, 
1998). The resettlements are particularly “visible” zones for 
administrative forces: the houses are all identical, enumerated 
and organized one after another similar to the structure of 
a chessboard. The PRC’s president Hu Jintao’s vision of a 
“harmonious society”, which has recently become the main 
aim of PRC policy, is mirrored in these new resettlements. 
These places in which the activities of the inhabitants in their 
well-aligned and identical houses are visible from a birds-
eye perspective, spatially reproduce the abstract concept of 
“harmonious” society.
The resettlements are thus a Chinese government response 
to problems associated with both environmental protection and 
control and surveillance of the population. The resettlements 
are part of wider strategies to protect and control the Tibetan 
Plateau’s natural resources, including the establishment of 
the Three Rivers’ Sources Nature Reserve. Nevertheless, they 
also enable the State to exert its power in a defined “milieu.” 
This power, interfering in the junction between a geographic 
milieu and human being, creates the conditions for its 
sovereignty (Foucault 2004: 3-56). Resettlement zones also 
serve to alter husbandry practices and force Tibetan herders 
to lead a sedentary life, thus bolstering territorial control. 
The resettlements reflect a multipronged strategy adopted by 
the Chinese government to solve problems of environmental 
and territorial governance on the one hand, and problems of 
sovereignty over the Tibetan highlands on the other.
CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown how ecological conceptions in the 
PRC are closely tied to the political discourse of territorial 
control. The ecological conceptions of Tibetan herders and 
State ecological policies were explained and analyzed through 
political contextualization and “microanalysis” of the local 
milieu.
Although a shared view of the Tibetan Plateau’s 
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reaching consequences for local political equilibriums and 
local people’s access to subsistence resources and commodity 
products.    
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